We spoke with Natalya Rimashevskaya, Director of the Institute of the Socio-Economic Problems of Demography, about what happened to the institution of the ‘Russian babushka’, the prospects for sustained birthrate growth and how to preserve the family.
– How long did you believe the growth in birthrates will continue?
– This should not be called growth but rather an upswing in birthrates, as it still remains lower than the mortality rate. Alas, as the 2010 census showed, the natural decrease of the population that began approximately in 1992 continues. It’s another matter that due to the fact that more children started being born, particularly around 2002-2003, than earlier, and the reduction is subsiding but nonetheless continuing.
The growth is related to the coming of age of those born in the early 1980s, when the country had some sort of pro-birth policy. At that time the vacations were lengthened for women, benefits increase and the workweek decreased. So now we are reaping the benefits. The generation from the 1980s is giving birth to first children. But very few are willing to brave having a second child.
– So this means the upswing is coincidence?
– No, slight growth will continue through 2012-2013. But then, according to various calculations, birthrates will decline through 2018-2022.
– Is there any chance that the birthrate will be greater than the death rate?
– In order for children to replace their parents, you need a birthrate of 2.15 children per woman. In Moscow this figure is 1.29 and growing while for the country as a whole it is stuck at 1.29. So the chances are minimal, but they nonetheless remain, that is, if a wise demographic policy is implemented.
– Explain why you assert that Russia faces a greater threat from the aging of the nation when it seems that Europe was the one to start this fashion?
– Retirees account for 28.3% of our population. By 2050, due to the threat poised by decreasing birthrates they could account for 45-55%. The average age of the workforce is approaching 45-50. But high technologies require young and mobile minds. But our labor productivity if 4-4.5 times less than in the United States. Experts of the World Bank advise Russia back in 2003 to increase the age of retirement to 62-65. But increasing the retirement age is not going bring about a major improvement, as most people by the time they reach 60 have a bunch of ailments. And this segment of the population as a rule in underqualified. So they will be pushed out either by employers or by younger, more enduring and adaptable workers. So it will nonetheless turn out that by 60 they will lose their jobs anyway. But instead of receiving a pension they will receive unemployment compensation. So the state is going gain anything.
– So how should we cope?
– There’s nothing new here: strengthen two values – the family and the middle class. At the same time, we shouldn’t fear the growth in the number of pensioners. We should learn to use their qualifications. In Western Europe the coefficient of pensioners is higher than in Russia, but they have higher labor productivity. The economically active worker is capable feeding himself, a pensioner and perhaps several pensioners. So that’s what we need to think about – growth in the quality and level of education, new technologies and boosting qualifications. And then everything will gradually level out.
– But in terms of the big picture, is there any way to stop the aging of the nation?
– Only through the natural and solitary method: increasing the birthrate. I’m sorry, but you need to have births. A maternity payment of 300,000 rubles and 1500 rubles monthly is not going to cut it. A new demographic policy needs to be formulated. To begin with, we should create a state program for revitalizing the health of future mothers and fathers. After all, 40% of children born in Russia have ailments from birth. Secondly, we need to revitalize the National Affordable Housing Project, housing is about as accessible for ordinary citizens as flying into space. Many people do not give birth as they don’t have any place to raise children. Thirdly, the standard of living needs to be raised. Yes, the poor as a rule have more children than the rich. But for some reason this axiom doesn’t hold true in Russia. The poor here do not want to have children. And those who tend to give birth to impoverishes and, as a rule, unhealthy children. And when they get older they have difficulty getting a higher education or making career.
– Do you believe that high technology, the megacity lifestyle and large families are compatible?
– We don’t have a choice. We need to do what the Spanish, Americans and Italians do – they find it fashionable to have three children. And they learn to balance work and family. The majority of the families that have good incomes, for example, Moscow families, have forgotten what father looks like and haven’t seen grandmother in a while. And children from a young age suffer from a lack of interaction. Another problem is the disappearance of the Russian babushka. Grandmothers are no longer looking after their grandchildren. They are working. In Moscow and other major cities there is a large portion of nuclear families (families living separately from grandparents). This works to break down the institution of the family. A grandmother can give a child a much better education than a pre-school. But the grandmother is absent, so the child is raised by the mother alone. In 2010 the Institute of Family and Upbringing carried out a research project called The Moscow Family. It revealed that more than 60% of single mothers and every third mother from intact families experienced difficulty engaging their child in sports. About 40% had difficult organizing the household and housekeeping, and problems arranging recreation for their children.
The reason here is simple – most mothers and grandmothers work. They don’t have time to engage their children in sports, keep up with the housekeeping and take their child on vacation. And this is doubly true for fathers. This is the lot of big cities that strive toward modernization. This is what is missing in the Concept of Demographic Policy through 2020. And this is why it needs to be thoroughly and not just cosmetically reexamined. We need to do like the Americans and free up time for families and children.
– On the average, how many children do Russian families have?
– The one-child family is become entrenched here. Of course, it’s a big country and there are families with large numbers of children, but the trend is toward one child. About 50% have one child, 15-16 have two children and the rest have three or more. And there is a dangerous upward trend in the number of married couples who do not want to have children.
– They probably account for less than one percent?
– The phenomenon of childless family is a new trend, so its difficult to identify the numbers. But it’s a worrying trajectory. It is a result of the instability of the new era and the formation of new values – living for the sake of oneself, one’s career and money.
– In order to halt the trend toward the aging of the nation, what is the average number of children that Russian families should have?
– At least 45%-50% should be two-child households. Otherwise more immigrants will have to be brought in. Yes, cheap labor resources are good for the economy, but you must understand the real cost – migrants increase the amount of labor and perhaps boost the size of the nation, but not its quality. After all, we are not the United States and not the European Union. We are getting not the best and the brightest but rather the hungriest.
Anton Samarin
