Those speaking two languages, or bilinguals, a new reality of post-Soviet space, proved ephemeral. In point of fact it is simply a gradual transition to titular languages while Russian, as a language of international communication, is getting crowded out of everyday use. Unless Russia strengthens its humanities influence in CIS and Baltic nations, from 40% to 90% of youth in CIS won’t speak Russian, says Russkiy Mir portal’s columnist Vladimir Emelyanenko.
After five years of absence from Kiev I could not recognize the local residents. Everywhere – except in marketplaces and shops – locals responded in Ukrainian to Russian speech. This was quite understandable, but on one occasion a girl was so carried away explaining how to get to Khreschatyk in her native tongue that I had to excuse myself for the lack of understanding.
“I should beg your pardon,” answered the girl. “I speak Russian so rarely that I haven’t managed to readjust.”
My acquaintance admitted that Ukrainians increasingly often give up Russian. Moreover, as reported by Eurasian Monitor, Ukraine takes the lead in terms of the drop of demand for Russian in CIS. In five recent years the share of those who speak Russian as their only language has plummeted from 49% to 34% of the population (the average reduction rate nears 3% a year). Ukraine topped the list of nations who are rapidly switching to the bilingual reality, using both Russian and their native tongue in everyday life. A sociological survey also reveals that the share of those who use Russian as the only language for everyday communication is falling in all former Soviet republics, and very steeply at that!
There are almost no Russian speakers in Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan (where from 0.5% to 6% of the population only use Russian as their only language). Other countries slowly, year after year, waive Russian as the language they earlier spoke at home or with their friends. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan account for the most rapid growth of bilingual population, whereas yesterday’s leaders – Moldova and Armenia – have seen a radical reduction of the share of bilinguals: Armenia – almost by 100% – and Moldova to a large extent. These two nations epitomize a new attitude toward Russian as the language for international communication.
In parallel, as the titular nationality drifts away from bilugualism, and the Russian-speaking minority is slowly drifting towards the bilingual category. In other words, not only are ethnic Moldovans speaking the titular language more, but even local Russians are switching to Moldovan. Russians in Latvia and Estonia, stimulated by the prospect of being granted the citizenship, were the first to start learning the local languages while the last to make these efforts were Russians in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who wanted to understand the document flow and not to lose their jobs. The attitudes and linguistic preferences of the younger generation who were born or grew up during the 2000s reflect these trends of the new linguistic policy in the post-Soviet space. Thus in the Baltic nations up to 88% of the titular youth do not speak Russian; in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan this figure stands at 60% and in the Trans-Caucasian region it is up to 70%. Such is the result of forming the statehood in these nations: the local youth largely absorbed the “new” values related to the nationalist ideology and are no longer motivated to absorb Russian language or culture. Striving for national and cultural independence, the youth of Georgia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Moldova are showing signs of isolationism.
But while everything is more or less clear with Turkmenistan that is shut off from the outer world, Moldova and the Baltic nations for now seem to be not quite adequate to their declared course for European values, integration into Europe, and the desire to be “a bridge to Europe” for CIS. The first years of fascination over an easy access to the EU space later led to disappointment, given that young people from those states could not afford a European education and find a socially respectable job enabling a rise up the social ladder. The Baltic and Moldovan youth are only welcome for vacancies that do not require professional qualifications. They even have their own niche in France, Scandinavian countries and Germany, named “new blacklegs” on an analogy with migrants from Turkey and Arab nations. This does not add self-respect to young people from Eastern European nations who already perceived themselves as part of Europe.
Nevertheless the linguistic trend is obvious: CIS youth aged 16-24 reject Russian, and the Russian-speaking stratum is thinning out. The youth of CIS states are oriented towards English, rather than Russian, but speak neither. The Russian language in everyday life is still ubiquitous; however, according to Moldovan political scientist Oazu Nantoy, this is “bygone age” in the minds of many Moldovans and a part of Moldova’s Russians. For almost everywhere education is given in native tongues and, even though teaching in Russian does take place, it is shrinking because Russia poorly uses this humanities resource.
True, Russian-speaking people in CIS retain high educational and cultural potential, often surpassing the titular language community in terms of professional skills, knowledge and culture; but being disenfranchised in their places of residence, they swell the ranks of local outcasts. Since they mainly reside in big cities or capitals, Russian-speaking “new outcasts” join a special group – residents of the capital cities who set cultural trends and advanced behavioral patterns.
The brightest examples of the Russian-speaking cities are Riga, Chisinau, Astana, Kiev and, to a lesser degree, Baku and Tallinn. Riga stands out in particular, with 54% of the population being these new ‘outcasts’ – people stripped of political rights but engaged in business, mass media and culture, which allows them together with the national ethnicity to participate in establishing and promoting a fashion for bilingualism. And that is why in most capitals of the CIS Russians retain their influence, and residents of these cities are orientated toward values of interethnic and international communication. And they are attracted to Russian culture and language. But the insufficient efforts of Russia s leading to substantially less influence of Russian speaking among the capital groups in Bishkek, Baku, Vilnius and Tashkent. And in Dushanbe, Yerevan and Tbilisi the Russian language is not welcomed amongst the local residents, which is why the new ‘outcasts’ are being crowded out of these countries. And those who remain are gradually migrating to the most depressed segments of society, which also works against the prospects for raising the profile of the Russian language and stimulating its development.
As forecasted by sociologists from World Poll Gallup and by linguists from the Pushkin Institute of Russian Language, Russia needs to expand the zone of its humanitarian influence and the teaching of Russian in order to give the Russian language a chance for survival in CIS and Baltic nations, given the mutual needs. Unless Russia doubles its efforts in this area, according to sociological forecasts, in 5-8 years from now up to 70% of the younger generation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; up to 40% in Kazakhstan; up to 60% in Armenia and Moldova; up to 20% in Ukraine; and up to 90% in Georgia and Azerbaijan won’t speak Russian.
Vladimir Emelyanenko
