The reaction of Russian emigres to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was relatively dispirited. This can partly be explained by the indifference to politics that characterized the new generation of emigrants. Despite the large number of “dissidents,” the third wave of emigration was far less ideological than the first two. During the 1960s and 1970s, many people left the Soviet Union not so much for political or ideological reasons as for economic ones. Or they left due to life’s circumstances, for example, for the purpose of family reunification.
Incidentally, the difficulty of family reunification became the first important consequence of the Afghan war for many emigrants from the former Soviet Union. After the Soviets introduced a “limited contingent” of forces in the central Asian country, a tightening of emigration policies took place. The authorities virtually ceased issuing permits to leave the country, which resulted in dramatically reduced rates of emigration. Beginning in 1981, emigration virtually stopped altogether. It is no coincidence that so many authors, for example, Mikaella Kagan, named the first half of the 1980s the “dead season.” In 1984-1986, only 500-600 people entered the United States each year. The number of “refuseniks,” however, increased significantly, with various data placing their numbers at 10,000-20,000.
Many families were forced to postpone emigration for many years. Others were separated in the literal sense of the word. Naturally, in such situations, changes in Soviet emigration policies and their effects disturbed our emigres much more than the Afghan war itself, which in reality was quite “distant.”
Naturally, all of this does not mean that emigres did not react at all to developments in Afghanistan, but the response was weaker than during the Hungarian events of 1956 or the Prague Spring. If we try to assess the general attitude of emigres to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with caution, we can talk about a “reincarnation” of the defeatism that had prevailed during the 1930s. At the same time, representatives of various political movements in exile demonstrated nearly complete unanimity. There was hardly anyone who wished outright for a Soviet military victory. These people included, perhaps, those who were aware that such an outcome was impossible. The very possibility of the communist regime falling as a result of war alone, of course, was not considered. Even the most intransigent opponents of the Soviet regime – the monarchists and former participants of Vlasov’s “Liberation Movement” – who took the position of “with the devil, but against the Bolsheviks” had no hope, so to speak, of coming to Moscow in the baggage of Afghan Mujahids.
High expectations were associated with the actions of the West and with the intensification of its efforts to counter the “Soviet expansion.” In addition, many emigres had hoped that the West would be able to achieve concessions from the Soviet Union on a number of issues.
Such attitudes among Russian emigres, however, appeared much earlier – almost immediately after the onset of the Cold War. Even in the 1950s and 1960s, many “rightist” йmigrй publications (e.g. Ivan Solonevich’s newspaper Nasha strana) repeatedly pointed out that the United States conducted “balanced” and “peaceful” policies in the interests of the “free world” and that the expansionist and aggressive aspirations of the Soviet regime and world communism in general were forcing it to “give up its principles.” Many rightists, including the monarchists (e.g. Kazantsev, etc.), called upon the American authorities to stifle the “hotbed of Communism” in Cuba as soon as possible. In 1970, the Russian right took an active role in a freedom march in Washington under the slogans “No concessions to the Communists!” and “Peace can only be achieved through military victory!”
Once the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, similar sentiments increased markedly. While emigres – mostly those with rightist views – did not count on the military defeat of the Soviet Union as a result of the war, many of them assumed that the Soviet leadership, having become bogged down in the Afghan conflict, would have to seek the mediation of the West in order to get out of the conflict. In doing so, it would have to make many concessions and temper its appetite for conquest.
Interestingly, supporters of rightist views did not count on the possibility of inner transformation of the Soviet regime as a result of the Afghan conflict. They also did not expect a transformation of the Cold War in general. They did not believe in the possibility of a new compromise between the Soviet Union and the West, similar to the Helsinki Accords. Even more, they didn’t count on the Soviet leadership actually upholding its agreements. All expectations were associated with the Soviet Union’s military failures and the success of the Mujahids made possible by Western military assistance, which was traditionally seen as the main factor that could ensure the destruction of the communist system.
The monarchists and other rightist elements in foreign countries found themselves in a somewhat ambivalent position. On the one hand, many of them displayed the strong psychological notion of being “inhabitants of a besieged city.” These people were able to leave one way or another (or even break) from the Soviet Union and find themselves in the “free world,” which stood opposed to communist expansion and supported emigres in their anti-Soviet activities. At the same time, many emigres, supporters of the “one and undivided,” understood that the West was not interested in the existence of a strong Russia. Accordingly, they urged their leaders not to equate the Soviet regime and the Russian people, who, like other “oppressed nations,” suffered from the “Communist enslaver.” Many of those on the right, including monarchists, refused on principle to cooperate with the CIA, the Intelligence Service, the BND, and other Western intelligence services.
All politically active emigres, regardless of their views, paid close attention to the issue of Soviet prisoners and defectors and in this matter showed great unanimity in their belief that the growth of defeatist attitudes among Soviet troops would force Soviet leaders to ask the question of how reliable their troops would be in event of war with the West. This would eventually paralyze the Kremlin's foreign policy initiatives, something that monarchist Yury Meyer wrote about in the magazine Nashi vesti, an organ of the the Russian Corps (during World War II this formation of Russian emigres fought with the Wehrmacht in the Balkans). Adhering to this position were the leaders of the National Labor Union (NTS). On the other side, however, was the dissident and former Soviet General Pyotr Grigorenko who published in the Paris-based Russkaya mysl on February 4, 1982 an address to the Soviet soldiers encouraging them to switch sides and join the Mujahids, after which they would be able to enter the “countries of the free world.” Similar appeals were published later by other Russian йmigrй organizations in the United States.
Many йmigrй organizations viewed these appeals as irresponsible and populist. For example, Mikhail Nazarov wrote in the journal Posev that the Soviet defectors have no guarantee that their lives would be saved. As early as 1980, the leadership of the NTS turned to the International Red Cross with a request that they assume the patronage of the Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan. This appeal went unanswered, however. At the same time, nearly everyone felt the need to make maximum use of the issue of defectors and prisoners of war for propaganda purposes, as well as prevent their return to the Soviet Union. Some йmigrй authors drew a parallel between the repatriation of Soviet prisoners to their homeland – whether voluntary or not was irrelevant – with Western governments’ forced return of Cossacks, followers of Vlasov and others like them after the Second World War. However, this all reflected йmigrй phobias to a much greater extent than the reality of the situation.
In general, the Afghan war gave a powerful impetus to political йmigrй publications and, in particular, the Sovietologists. In the 1980s, a large number of works appeared by authors (e.g., Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikov) who tried to “figure out” specifically which of the elderly Soviet leaders were supporters or opponents of sending troops into Afghanistan. Setting aside this entire amusing criminology, it turns out that many йmigrй Sovietologists were unable, despite the large amount of factual material, to predict many of the long-term effects of the Afghan conflict on our country. Above all, they were unable to predict the confrontation with radical Islam that began in those years (not to be confused with Islam in general) and the emergence of a permanent source of tension in Central Asia. These are the effects of that already distant war that even now have not been eliminated.
