In a recent online poll devoted to important figures in Russian history, Alexander Nevsky took first place. As one critic pointed out, however, a large number of those voting knew about the prince only from Eisenstein’s film. Many of the votes, therefore, were not informed so much by knowledge of a real historical figure as by the brilliant role played by Nikolai Cherkasov. Pyotr Stolypin, who garnered 524,575 votes and came in second, might be considered the true winner.
There is no disputing the fact that Stolypin was Imperial Russia’s greatest prime minister. Unfortunately, the personality rating of this distinguished statesman (possibly the last real statesman in Imperial Russia) is occasionally determined by the policies that he pursued. One can frequently hear the assertion that had he been able to carry out all of his reforms in full, the country’s history would have turned out considerably different and avoided the catastrophe that took place in 1917.
Obviously, there is no way this assertion can be tested experimentally, but given the fact that the general direction of the Stolypin reforms is well known, as well as the fact that several of them went quite far, we can evaluate to a certain extent whether the course taken by Stolypin could have liquidated the reasons that gave rise to the revolutionary explosions, first in 1905 and later in 1917.
Having taken the premiership and extinguished the revolutionary chaos, Stolypin, unlike many of his political opponents on the right, understood quite well that it wasn’t enough to simply apply force to suppress the revolution. It was necessary to carry out those political and economic reforms that would at least minimize the problems that had led the country toward a revolutionary situation, if not eliminate them altogether. There were at least three such problems:
1. Polarization of the governing class – A broad spectrum of the intelligentsia, industrialists, merchants and liberal nobility were unhappy that virtually all power was within the hands of the ruling bureaucracy. They demanded the right to participate in the country’s governance through elective bodies at the local and state levels.
2. The issue of land – A significant part of the Russian peasantry was barely keeping its head above water, having settled for small land plots. At the same time, a significant amount of the land was held by large owners: landed gentry, churches and the public treasury. Accordingly, the peasantry aggressively demanded a more just means of distributing the land.
3. Finally, the issue of nationality – Representatives from a number of non-Russian nationalities demanded that their legal status be improved. They also insisted that their national demands be satisfied. The Jews expressed the most discontent, especially with respect to stringent interest rates, the pale of settlement, inability to enter government service and dozens of other restrictions. The list of “aggrieved” peoples also included Poles, Finns, Ukrainians and many others.
Let us examine the extent to which Stolypin’s reforms allowed these problems to be resolved.
We’ve already discussed how Stolypin tried to overcome the polarization of the governing class. Thanks to a change in electoral law, he was able to form a working pro-government majority in the Third Duma. The backbone of this majority was made of moderately liberal representatives of society. Theoretically, with time this majority could have been expanded to the left to include other liberal groups, especially the Kadets (even more so because several leaders of the party had good personal relations with Stolypin). However, as we have already discussed, Stolypin himself turned out to be the grave digger of the June 3 system that he had created under by assuming that there would be cooperation between the government and the moderate social forces. After the scandal over the law on the Western Zemstvo, the Octobrists declined to support the prime minister. Their leader, Alexander Guchkov, who had previously been a loyal “henchman” of Stolypin, defiantly resigned his post as speaker of the Duma. All hopes of reaching a peace between “society” and the “government” quickly faded.
More on the Western Zemstvo. As we have already discussed, one of the central ideas of this legislation concerned the creation of a complex curial system that would have guaranteed the predominance of Russians in the newly elected zemstvos. This proposed law was certainly not the only measure aimed at strengthening the Russian influence in the western provinces of the empire. It is not at all difficult to guess that that this legislation was being pushed through at the expense of other national minorities. In particular, the law on the Western Zemstvo was aimed at reducing Polish influence in the region. Another anti-Polish law followed, which the Poles referred to as the Fourth Partition of Poland. This law dealt with the formation of the Kholm Governorate by separating the eastern parts of the Sedlets and Lublin Governorates. After Poland came Finland: in 1910, the Duma adopted a law that virtually negated the “duchy’s” autonomy within the empire. It is not at all difficult to imagine how similar measures did nothing to contribute to the non-Russians’ love for the government.
It is true that Stolypin’s nationalities policy did not lead exclusively to Russian nationalism and “suppression” of the national minorities. With respect to the Jewish question, the prime minister advocated removing the numerous restrictions, as he considered them harmful not only to the Jews but to Russia as a whole. Moreover, in 1906, the Council of Ministers under Stolypin’s initiative approved a bill that would have revisited the decrees restricting the rights of Jews, which assumed abolishment of a number of discriminatory laws. This bill failed to become law, however. On December 10, 1906, Nicholas II returned the Council of Ministers’ journal to Stolypin, which contained the bill, unapproved, along with his remarks in a letter: “Despite the most convincing conclusions, a voice inside me said not to make this decision. To this day my conscience has never deceived me.”
Unwilling to compromise the emperor, Stolypin decided not to go public with this story, which meant that the public, including the Jews, never learned of his intention to abolish a number of the discriminatory laws. Subsequent legislation introduced by Stolypin even involved new anti-Jewish restrictions. For example, the law of the volost zemstvo that was proposed by the prime minister stated specifically that the Jews would receive neither active nor passive electoral rights.
Let us now address Stolypin’s main progeny – agrarian reform. On the one hand, the prime minister, unlike his opponents on the left, understood first of all that transferring all noble and treasury lands to the peasantry would not solve the problem of land. Secondly, he understood that the main problem affecting the Russian peasantry was not a lack of land; rather, it was their exceedingly ineffective and unproductive use of the land. Stolypin likely understood the main reason for the Russian peasantry’s misfortunes – the communal nature of agriculture in which land plots were always transferred from hand to hand, thereby depriving peasants of impetus to put any energy and resources into “unowned” land. The measure he proposed for an exit from the commune “with land” and subsequent transfer of this land to private ownership with time could have led to the emergence of a new class of strong farmers.
We must remember, though, that the agrarian issue was not just one of economics; it also had a psychological element. As far as the majority of the peasantry was concerned, landownership was immoral and “illegal,” as the landowners had received their land together with serfs. The latfifundia preserved by Stolypin were seen by the peasantry in the same way as a red flag is seen by a bull.
The historian Aron Averkh has cited numerous pieces of evidence on the Russian village on the eve of the First World War. “Regardless of their political convictions, everywhere everyone complained about their smoldering hatred of the landowners and kulaks. Nobody doubted whatsoever that at the first signs of commotion, the Russian village would erupt, just as it had done during the 1905 revolution and how it would do once again in 1917.”
To summarize, Pyotr Stolypin understood the country’s problems quite well, and he tried to bring about a resolution to the best of his abilities. The result of his attempts, however, was disappointing. Owing to a number of problems, he was unable to defuse even one of the ticking time-bombs that threatened Russia’s stability. Moreover, several of the problems became even more acute as a result of his reforms.
Stolypin did succeed in suppressing the first wave of revolutionary chaos. Despite all of his powers, Russia nevertheless remained a tinder box that was ready to explode at any spark, which is exactly what happened in 1917.
