On November 22, the main events marking the 75th anniversary of the Famine were held in Kiev. This date was naturally one that we couldn’t get past in Ukraine. Preparations for the commemoration had been seriously underway since early 2007. In April 2008, the Cabinet of Ministers allocated 7.4 million hryvnia for the events, which were planned to be held across the entire country. Aside from “official” commemorations in the capital, an information campaign was designed to increase lessons in schools on the memory of the Famine and compile lists of victims. Ukrainian officials participated in an international “eternal flame” campaign to remember the victims. Different cities established monuments. Preparations were under the direct supervision of President Viktor Yushchenko, who did not hesitate to reprimand the heads of district administrations for poorly preparing to officially commemorate the events.
The 75th anniversary of the Famine is being marked for a second year in Ukraine. The Famine broke out in 1932-1933, but this year the commemoration is taking place with particular magnitude. On November 21-22, the leaders of Macedonia, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as officials from other countries are expected to arrive in Kiev. Viktor Yushchenko appealed to Pope Benedict XVI and Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople requesting prayers for the victims of the Famine.
The commemoration of the anniversary this year was preceded by a noisy political campaign. Back in 2006, the Verkhovna Rada passed a law that recognized the Famine as an act of genocide against Ukrainians and stated that public denial of this assertion is considered desecration of the memory of the victims. Moreover, President Yushchenko proposed amendments that would enable prosecution of individuals who publicly challenged the official version of events. At the same time, Ukraine has actively sought international recognition of the Famine as an act of genocide. Although several countries have recognized the Famine as genocide, there have been several other notable occasions. In September, despite the efforts of its diplomats, the Ukrainian delegation at the UN Human Rights Council did not receive support and was forced to withdraw the draft resolution “The Memory of the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine.” A European Parliament resolution expressed sympathy for the Ukrainian people but nevertheless decline to recognize the Famine as genocide. This past May, PACE refused to acknowledge that the Famine affected only the Ukrainian people. Similarly, resolutions adopted on November 1, 2007 by the UNESCO General Conference did not recognize the Famine as genocide.
The zeal of the current Ukrainian leadership is understandable. Until now, attempts to create a national ideology in Ukraine have failed. There is still no national idea or a hero. Proposals on the role of Mazepa or Shukhevych are still received by Ukrainian society as grounds for dispute because, at this stage at least, there can be no uniting symbols. The memory of the Famine, as those surrounding the Ukrainian president had hoped, should serve as a rallying point for the nation on the basis of a common tragic history. At the same time, international recognition of the Famine as an act of genocide should serve as a means of pressuring Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, to accept responsibility for the crimes of Stalin's regime.
It is worth recognizing that the issue of the Famine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainians is perhaps now the most powerful ideological weapon held by the Ukrainian authorities. No other historical myths assiduously created in Ukraine can cause the same harm over time, not only between Russia and Ukraine as states, but also between our societies. Regarding Mazepa, arguments can quite easily be made on the academic and everyday levels. This is generally an issue of ideology and historical approach. The Famine is a truly frightful and relatively recent tragedy, and its witnesses are still alive. Natural human emotions will be a major factor in any dispute.
It is difficult to argue with the notion that the Famine in Ukraine and elsewhere in the Soviet Union was a crime against the people, at least according to modern understanding. However, in such an emotional background it is especially easy to bring into the debate the idea that the Famine was a consciously instituted genocide against the Ukrainian people. Such ideas come more from cold calculations than hot feelings.
People have made statements that Ukraine “believes that the Famine of the 1930s was a genocide against the Ukrainian people, but no individual people or state is blamed.” Diplomatic reservations, however, cannot negate the main point of this message: the Soviet state, with its capital in Moscow, specifically organized the genocide against the Ukrainian people. President Yushchenko has emphasized the need to speak the truth about the tragedy, saying, “step by step we will always be knocking at every door and telling the truth about the tragedy. We will convey this truth to our children. We must bring this tragedy to the world...” The events are discussed as if someone is really trying to conceal the truth and not give people the opportunity to express their grief. The heightened emotional background does not provide the best conditions for discussion either, which makes it so advantageous for the Ukrainian authorities to diligently work to convince society of the truthfulness behind its version of the tragic events that took place 75 years ago.
The topic of the Famine, hardly by accident, fits very well into the rhetoric of Ukraine’s anti-Russian leadership. Many Ukrainian politicians hint at Russia’s role as a successor state to the Soviet Union and, consequently, to the notion that all crimes committed bf the Soviet leadership fall on Russia. Responsibility on the part of the Soviet party apparatus and Stalin personally for organizing an artificial famine is considered absolutely proven. It is no accident also that the commemoration of the Famine, decreed by Yushchenko on November 22, falls on the “Day of Freedom” – the anniversary of the Orange Revolution. These two dates, it seems, are intended to be firmly merged in the Ukrainian national consciousness.
The recent refusal by Dmitry Medvedev to travel to Kiev for the anniversary commemoration only serves as an answer to this hidden rhetoric by Ukrainian authorities. Hardly anyone doubted his decision, although perhaps unexpected was the response in which Medvedev explained the motivations behind his refusal. Even more surprisingly, the presidential statement was greeted with sympathy, even by those who are accustomed to speak critically of Russian authorities. The clear and sharp language expressing positions on controversial historical issues from the Russian leadership is something that we are not used to, and the initiative is certainly welcome. Moreover, it is difficult to disagree with either the ideas in Medvedev’s statement or with its tone.
The decision to respond at a “high level” could be called into question by asking whether the cost of entering into combat with such heavy artillery was worth it. It should be noted, however, that the logic of silence in relations with Ukraine and other neighboring countries has long been proven to be ineffective. Silencing critical issues only serves to ensure that anti-Russian messages dominate the media in Ukraine and other countries.
An unambiguous answer at the highest level in this case is important and necessary. It not only formulates some kind of national position and changes the information field regarding the events surrounding the Famine, but it also encourages Ukrainians to make a sensible choice in favor one position.
Resistance to the distortion of history in Ukraine should not end with Medvedev’s statement. Perhaps even more important would be a community initiative, which would keep the discussion from being confined to the heads of state or agencies charged with foreign policy. In this case, the challenges facing our society and the state are the same. Preventing the formation of national historical concepts in neighboring states (this concerns not only Ukraine) is impossible and even unnecessary, as nation building is impossible without these countries rethinking their own histories. Creating opportunities for a full public debate and testing new historical hypotheses born in the former Soviet Union is necessary. Such opportunities for intellectual curiosity by our society are not being fully utilized, and in this sense the role of the state in establishing a full-fledged, properly functioning expert society that is authoritative not only in Russia but also abroad cannot be overemphasized. This is one very important area of Russian state policy.
