The current Constitution of the Russian Federation took effect on the date of its publication in Rossiyskaya gazeta – December 25, 1993. However, Constitution Day, which until recently was an official holiday, was celebrated on December 12 when it was adopted by popular vote.
The reason for this popular vote was a decree issued by President Boris Yeltsin on October 15, 1993. It is not difficult to put two and two together and see that this decree was issued immediately following the dramatic events of early October – the dispersal of the Supreme Soviet and the effective termination of the Russian Soviet Constitution of 1978.
The adoption of the constitution was also quite dramatic, not least of all because considerably less than half of all registered voters voted for it (58.43% voted “for,” with a turnout of 54.8%). There is every reason to believe that achieving a turnout rate of even 50% was extremely difficult. Several expert groups, including a group that was working with the presidential administration at the time, compiled reports that showed serious fraud and a real turnout figure of 46-49%. Nobody disputes the fact that the majority voters did in fact vote “for” the constitution.
So, Russia’s constitution was the direct result of a bitter power struggle between the president and the Supreme Soviet. The civil war lasted only one day, but it was definitely a civil war. When the holiday calendar underwent adjustment and more days were needed for the New Year’s holiday, nobody disputed the cancellation of Constitution Day, as it was a holiday that no one had ever really celebrated in the first place.
All of the above suggests the seemingly obvious conclusion about the time and the inadequacy of the constitution. Indeed, many very intelligent people in the early 1990s said that the constitution was doomed to be constantly rewritten and to eventually disappear. Fifteen years have passed, however, and the picture is not at all what these intelligent people envisioned.
Over the ensuing 15 years, the country has succeeded in surviving the “abysm of the 1990s,” experiencing a renaissance and stable development and once again finding itself on the edge as a result of a global financial crisis. Three presidents have been in power. The constitution remains unchanged and is almost exactly the same as the document that was adopted in 1993 (apart from a recent amendment extending the presidential term to six years, it was completely unchanged). Moreover, it is this constitution, adopted by the victory of one group over another, which is the basis of consensus for all of Russian society. The level of loyalty to the Constitution is not only high, but uniquely high. While people don’t express great enthusiasm for the constitution (unlike during the 19th and early 20th centuries when constitutions were objects of great admiration), but today there are virtually no political or social forces that express disapproval of the constitution. Nor are there any groups that are openly disloyal to the document. Of course, if Putin with Medvedev were so inclined to change the constitution, they could change any of its articles, even to the point of inscribing rules on the Senate credentials of the president’s and prime minister’s pets. Surveys show, however, that any initiative to change the constitution gets far less support than initiatives that do not concern the constitution.
The constitution is not something that turned out perfectly, but it did turn out acceptably. An acceptable constitution is what was needed during Russia’s formative years. It is this normality that made it so meaningful – both during the “abyss of the 1990s” and during today’s era of stability.
The constitution was designed so that it can be adapted to a variety of situations. For example, the abolition of gubernatorial elections was achieved without any change in the constitution. Despite this flexibility, the document has nevertheless remained a framework that puts systemic limitations in place.
The presidential system of government is the main problem of the current constitution. It has played into presidents’ hands well because it is thanks to this system that presidential power can be built in any way depending on the circumstances or a particular leader’s personality.
The problem of organizing presidential power should be dealt with separately. It is precisely this problem that may in the future (and not necessarily far into the future) become the main reason for drastic changes being made to the current constitution.
The 1993 Constitution gives Russia a presidential system of government. This is obvious and does not give rise to objections by hardly anyone. However we relate to a concrete president, it is precisely the presidential system of power that is accepted by the majority as being suitable for our circumstances. This presidential system is based on two very different types of presidential republic – the United States and France.
In terms of presidential powers, our system is close to the United States, although the latter has no executive power that is not directly linked to the president. In this sense, the United States has no government per se, as there is no prime minister. The functions of government are performed by the presidential administration and headed by the president himself. Such a concentration of presidential power in the United States is offset by a very high degree of autonomy of the individual states, and, consequently, the power of the Congress.
France is a unitary country, and as a result, when they created a presidential republic (in the constitution of 1958), the American model was rejected. In France, the president has noticeably fewer powers, and the government is headed by a parliamentary majority that acts as a counterbalance to the president (the government and the prime minister are not appointed by the president but by the parliament).
Is not difficult to see that in our system of government, which is not directly subordinate to parliament, a certain excess exists. The powers of the president can, on the one hand, totally control the government. On the other hand, they can almost entirely change the country’s government so that the country is run through the presidential administration (through the issuance of presidential decrees).
In the early 2000s, when regional authorities were very independent, many people proposed changing our presidential system to make it look more like that of the United States (i.e., to abolish the government). However, as the vertical of power developed, a presidential dictatorship resulted. The president was granted such powers that he automatically became a dictator.
Today, popular opinion favors the French model: preservation and strengthening of government and its head. In an ideal situation, the prime minister, appointed by parliament and under its control, would remove the excessive stress of presidential power and thus strike a balance. But this would not gain us a strong prime minister, as we have already had one for six months now. Structural changes in the system of government are needed in order to establish a direct connection between the prime minister and parliament and sharply reduce the prime minister’s dependence on the president.
To date, however, these kinds of constitutional amendments will find absolutely no support. In our current situation, it is not the prime minister who represents parliament and is controlled by the latter; rather, it is parliament that represents the prime minister and is controlled by him. For the French system to work properly, there must be independent and strong political parties that occasionally lead to situations in which the president and the head of government represent different parties, an opposition that will naturally establish an acceptable balance of power.
Even under the most critical outlook, there is no basis today for changing the constitution. In some places it simply does not need to be altered; in others, the time has simply not yet arrived. The fact that a “temporary” constitution has survived 15 tumultuous years is an event worthy in itself.
