The main intrigue has been resolved. Everything happened as predicted. On January 27, 2009, a new head of the Russian Orthodox Church was elected. That Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad would be chosen was predicted long before the Church Council convened, although it only became clear once the vote tally was announced.
The doubts expressed concerning the victory of Metropolitan Kirill were weakly based on the idea that his main competitor, chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate Metropolitan Kliment of Kaluga and Borovsk, would be able to unite the church opposition around himself. The uncertainty about the outcome was due to the relative obscurity of church organization and a weak knowledge on the part of most journalists regarding internal church matters, especially on the distribution of power within the hierarchy.
All this was obviously fueled by the main passion of journalists – a love of intrigue and dramatic turns of events. Every story needs its hero, nemesis and a conflict –the driving force of the story. Even if there were no confrontation, one could be “invented.” One way or another, the election of the patriarch was indeed less predictable than, for example, the election of the Russian president. To outside observers, it was certainly more exciting.
Of the three candidates for the patriarchate, Metropolitan Kirill dominated (97 votes to 32) over his main competitor, Metropolitan Kliment. Public opinion was also on the side of Kirill. An internet referendum was recently held whereby Kirill received more than 40% of the votes (31,454 votes). His competitors lagged behind by a large margin – Metropolitan Filaret won 708 votes (0.9%) and Metropolitan Kliment received 433 votes (0.6%). Even if they didn’t mention him by name, most experts commenting on the election supported Kirill’s candidacy based on the need for an active dialogue between the Church and society.
It is difficult to talk about a dramatic election campaign, if only because the event proved too fleeting. In this sense, a certain unceremonious haste to convene the Church Council played a positive role by not allowing all the internal church conflicts to splash out. This is something from which the church has most likely won rather than lost. It is not clear what the consequences of an exhaustible electoral campaign would have been.
Nevertheless, internally, the battle was serious enough. It was no accident that people referred to “a sleaze war” and the use of “dirty” electoral methods.
It is difficult for supporters of both Kirill and Kliment to deny the existence of major pretensions on both sides, especially those that were made public. Not all of these pretensions were harmless. By and large, however, we should not overestimate the importance of these squabbles. In general, they did not go beyond the bounds of what is considered permissible and did not inflict any substantial damage on the reputation of the Russian Orthodox Church. Everything will likely soon be forgotten at any rate. It is in the interests of both sides that this happens. In terms of evaluating the “purity” of the electoral campaign, there is no absolute point of reference. Following the election of the patriarch the majority of our society found that everything was conducted appropriately, especially in light of the rough and tumble nature of secular political campaigns. In any event, it is difficult to get away from the idea that it could have been much more dramatic. It is only enough to imagine what kind of “sleaze war” could have ensued had Metropolitan Volodymyr of Kiev and All Ukraine been under consideration and the Ukrainian card had been played. Part of this picture would have been President Yushchenko and his dreams of creating a single Ukrainian autocephalous church, not to mention those of Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko), leader of the self-proclaimed Kiev Patriarchate.
If we talk about the effectiveness of the campaign, by law all the laurels (and, more importantly, the main trophy) went to Metropolitan Kirill. Despite statements from both sides that Church elections should not be put on the same level with political ones and that a different logic and atmosphere prevails, Metropolitan Kirill conducted his campaign according to modern political rules. He was fully able to use the skills he acquired while serving as head of the Department for External Church Relations at the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as the lobbying power that came from the election of the acting patriarch. Able to impose his strategy, he secured a date for the elections that would be advantageous for him. Throughout the campaign Kirill was very active (he appeared in the media several times more frequently than his rivals), rallied his supporters to organize themselves and did not allow an opposition party to form. He was allegedly able to secure the Kremlin’s support for his candidacy, which was important, although initially it was not obvious that he was the choice candidate. The best proof comes from the very words of Metropolitan Kirill himself about how the Russian Orthodox Church has mastered new forms of outreach through the use of modern technology, which he used during the campaign.
Most of the media portrayed the two main candidates’ opposition as a struggle between the two parties – the religious conservatives and the liberals. Kliment was seen as a possible “book patriarch” while Kirill was viewed as a “manager patriarch.” The first group, it was thought, would seek a certain degree of insulation from society and the state so as to concentrate on internal church issues properly. The second, conversely, would pursue an active dialogue with society and seek to influence it. This model is useful because it allows us to effectively explain the substantive differences within the Church. It appears, though, that, like any model, this one only corresponds to reality in part.
Russian society itself, which for the most part is secular, was expecting for the election of a patriarch who would help bring solutions to problems it was facing. One of the main problems was how the Church, through the new patriarch, would interact with society. Internal issues for the Church, from church buildings to dogmatism to relations with other Christian bodies and religions, remain secondary for most Russians. But, as correctly noted, the new patriarch and the Church, regardless of which party he belongs to, cannot avoid the “challenges of modernity.” The patriarch is a public figure by definition, and there are too many questions from society that are too pressing, which means that he cannot avoid them. Insulation would be too sharp of a contrast to the tradition of the past twenty years where the Church was strongly linked to both state and society.
Yesterday we witnessed a truly historic event. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad received a majority of votes to become the sixteenth patriarch. He is young, healthy and ambitious. There is no reason to doubt that a new era is opening for the Russian Orthodox Church. What kind of era it will be is another question entirely, one that can only be answered over time. Furthermore, the life of the Church and its path of development are not determined by the patriarch alone.
As for the short term, we should not expect any radical changes Discussion of future changes may not be very gratifying either, as to a large extent Metropolitan Kirill under the late Patriarch Alexy II played a major role in determining policy. Metropolitan Kirill presented himself as a flexible leader who is able to find compromise. We can expect that these qualities, which he exercised so clearly when he was responsible for “external policy” at the Department for External Church Relations, will guide his approach to “internal policy” as well. We can hardly expect to see a “purge” carried out against supporters of his chief opponent in the election, Metropolitan Kliment. The Church simply does not face insurmountable differences. The former bishop of Chukotka, Diomid, managed to consolidate the irreconcilable. In the end, what will ultimately take place is a minor balancing inside the Church.
In the end, Kirill’s party, responsible for external relations, to a large extent determined the face of modern Russian Orthodoxy. In other words, he determined the style of public communication with those outside the Church. In this respect, changes are likely. The style of the Metropolitan, a clever and enlightened church politician, will set a new tone in terms of communication. Undoubtedly, it will become much more lively and active. There have always been ways to strengthen the influence of the Church in society, and now is certainly no exception. It does seem that the supporters of Kirill would like to use them. The Church’s moral authority – its capital – is simply too great to be neglected. By way of analogy, the new party, for fear of further value inflation, wants to put this capital to use. How best to make use of this asset without squandering it (which is entirely possible) is the main issue for the new patriarch. In the end, the idea of effective management may come to characterize the Church, but only in this elevated sense.
