Discussion: Do we need a law on the denigration of historical memory?
From the editor: We continue our discussion on whether it is necessary to enact legislation that would regulate discussion of topics related to the role of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. The site’s editor, Stanislav Kuvaldin, offers his view on the question. We would like to emphasize, however, that the site’s editorial board has not taken a position on this particular issue. The opinions expressed by participants in the discussion are of a personal nature only.
Whatever name is given to the new law that is being prepared for the sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, we can be certain of one thing: if this law is adopted, the discussion of any topic related to the Soviet Union’s role will be subject to legislative regulation anywhere in Russia.
As of yet, we are not completely aware of the extent to which discussion of these issues will be limited. I don’t think that even those who are developing the legislation have a clear idea. It is possible, however, to imagine the nature of some of these restrictions by recalling the words of Sergey Shoigu, who has said that after the law is adopted, the mayors in cities Soviet monuments are being removed will begin to think before acting. And then there are his comments suggesting that even the presidents of some countries will not be able to travel to Russia with “impunity.” Boris Gryzlov clarifies things even more. At a press conference on March 10, he said, “In recent years we have increasingly seen the distortion of facts in post-Soviet history concerning the Great Patriotic War. We have seen the defamation of the role of the Soviet Union in this war and in the liberation of Europe from the fascist occupiers. We see such examples in Ukraine and the Baltic States.”
In other words, it is already quite clear where the proposed new law will be directed. We can understand the motives that have driven the bill’s initiators. This law, which affects such a monumental and at the same time so personal a subject for each family, has limits and possibilities that remain unknown to the initiators themselves. Of all the questions raised in connection with Shoigu’s initiative, this is perhaps the biggest.
To start, the insult of someone else's history by politicians from foreign governments can always be seen as an occasion for diplomatic dйmarches. This has always occurred and is always a task for diplomacy. If community or government officials in neighboring countries take the liberty of saying something that can be seen as an insult, there are many ways to bring this to the attention of the parties insulted. In addition to formal channels, there are many informal ones, including the media, NGOs, and civil society in general. These means are quite flexible, as establishing once and for all what is considered offensive or not is usually an awkward task. In the end, people change, countries change, times change and mores change. It can be assumed, however, that some notions always retain a certain value and that no one can be permitted to encroach on them. This is something that people generally understand intuitively, save, perhaps, for those who are deliberately asocial. So these are conflicts that can be resolved in one way or another.
But now we are being advised to enact a law in which what is considered offensive in Russia will be firmly established. At the same time as this law is coming into effect, neo-Nazi tendencies – obvious or perceived – can be seen in the Baltic States and Ukraine – in other words, outside Russia. Every possible means of public reaction against these trends has already been tried: diplomatic notes, demonstrations in front of embassies and unambiguous statements to the media. Moreover, they have been used abundantly, often forcing us to keep in mind a sense of taste and measure. It seems, however, that those organizing the protests have not achieved their goals.
Perhaps this all suggests that the measures employed have not been entirely successful or that Russia is unable to use its own soft power. Perhaps it speaks of the strength of those nuisances against which the protests have been directed. At any rate, a decision has been made to back these protests with law. This law, which will apply only in Russia, obviously does not directly touch those whose actions and deeds are seen by the law’s backers as especially irritating.
In other words, the realm in which the balance between state and social forces has an enormous influence on the effectiveness of any actions will be rigidly organized on the basis of a law, which, in theory, is supported by the force of the state. In actual fact, protests by those who are recognized as independent commonly have a far greater effect than laws, and, accordingly, there is reason to believe that this law will not have the best impact on the achievability of the desired goals. Instead, the adoption of this law cannot be without consequence inside Russia, simply because the proposed law will be applied in Russia. In the second part of the article, we will discuss these possible consequences.
