On March 24, 1999, NATO’s combined forces began Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia. It is worth remembering these events from ten years ago, as they help us to understand how the world has changed in the time since, including how Russia and Russian society have changed. Such a round figure provides a good opportunity to take stock.
The bombing of Yugoslavia in certain ways can be seen as the last war of the era before the invention of the enemy of all that is good, an enemy which goes under the name “international terrorism.” More precisely, the justification for the use of limited force anywhere in the world had not yet been defined, which meant that the war in 1999, therefore, became the final element in a series of military conflicts on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and was based on several other considerations. NATO led a war against “Europe’s last dictator” in part due to the legacy of communism (Slobodan Milosevic’s communist past was often emphasized in various publications and statements by Western politicians). The war was also against Serbian chauvinism, which was seen as a direct threat to neighboring countries. In other words, to world public opinion the war appeared as a battle against the ugly remnants of the past. In this sense, these developments appear to have been the culmination of Western efforts to arrange a new world in which communism was defeated and the forces of progress were able to smoke the last remaining reactionaries from their snake nests.
During the war, a very large segment of Russian society took the side of Yugoslavia, although the reason was hardly sympathy for Slobodan Milosevic or fraternal feelings for “our Orthodox brothers.” The opposition simply came from the fact that Russia’s place in this new map of the world was simply too undefined. What was defined was only the past of a large country, in other words the communist or national yesterday – the same yesterday from which we were delivered by a pledge of happiness on the part of the free world. A rather unattractive present, combined with a foggy future meant that holding on to the past occasionally seemed to be the only way out. As such, Yugoslavia was seen as a model for Russia. What was taking place there, the flagrant injustice, ignited fears that ours would be the next door to be knocked on by those doing battle with evil.
Coupled with the degree to which NATO sided with the Kosovar Albanians and how deliberately the decision was was made to attack an independent country, which for nearly ten years was “deemed” the ultimate and sole perpetrator of the atrocities in the civil wars taking place in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, made sympathy for Yugoslavia inevitable in Russian society. The feeling that an absolute injustice was taking place was practically universal.
The most vivid manifestation of these feelings was, perhaps, the protesting that took place outside the American embassy in Moscow. Such wanton celebration of civil solidarity that these demonstrations became – when fans from opposing soccer clubs and members of otherwise enemy youth subcultures got together to shout against Clinton and in support of Serbia -was only possible in an atmosphere when everyone, regardless of political belief or material status, was firmly convinced which side truth was on – who needed to be defended and who needed to be the target of protest. What was especially important is that these gatherings took place almost poetically and without any clear support from the authorities or a direct relationship to any political party.
It is difficult to say whether such a movement could have resulted in something more than noisy demonstration in front of someone else's embassy. What, for example, would have happened if the outcome of the war could have been considered not a full defeat of Yugoslavia, if some kind of merit could have been seen in the final result? Would it not ahve created the desire in the same way to deal on our own with the obvious injustices in our own country? But nothing like that has happened. Yugoslavia, of course, was not able to withstand the combined forces of the North Atlantic Alliance and in the end had to accept the conditions imposed on them and withdraw their troops from Kosovo, which were immediately replaced by NATO units. It is believed that Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was appointed as the president’s special representative to Yugoslavia, played a considerable role in persuading Slobodan Milosevic to stop the fighting. During those years of negotiation, Chernomyrdin’s merits included the ability, precisely when the situation reached an extreme, to accept all the conditions presented, thereby possibly avoiding additional casualties, as was the case in Budyonnovsk. In situations where there was real risk of NATO escalating its bombardment of Yugoslavia’s ground operations, Chernomyrdin’s talents might have been quite necessary. In any case, to assume that the Americans would have acted cowardly before the valiant Yugoslav army (as many in Russia would have liked to believe at the time) seems unjustified. The fate of Yugoslavia in the event such a war had broken out could have been much more worse.
Another striking episode of the events surrounding Yugoslavia was the battle march to Pristina by Russian paratroopers from the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia. This march can be compared with the demonstrations in front of the American embassy in Russia. Although vivid and surprising to the West, it was absolutely meaningless in the end. At the time in Russia, however, it was enough to lift the spirits of the people and inspire a feeling that we were at least able to do something to oppose the West. The sense of “opposing the West, at least somehow” was perhaps the most important thing at that moment for Russian society. Given the experience of the 1990s, it could hardly have been considered a healthy reaction.
One can’t help but noting that the war in Yugoslavia came during a major transition period for Russia, between the “wild nineties” and a new era that began shortly thereafter and continues to this day. Describing all the transitions that have taken place in Russia over the last decade is a task in itself, but using the war in Yugoslavia as an example causes certain things to be come apparent. Kosovo has achieved independence that a number of governments have recognized, although Russia categorically refuses to recognize it. The precedent of Kosovo’s independence, however, resulted in a number of consequences, including Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which took place after the August war between Russia and Georgia, an event few would have considered possible ten years ago. Russia battled against a Georgia governed by a leader who came to power as a result of the Rose Revolution – the massive demonstrations against an unpopular regime. The events in the fall of 2000 in Yugoslavia, which led to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic, are often seen as the first among these types of revolutions. Perhaps justifiably, Russia believed that these revolutions could not have taken place without intervention from the West. Consequently, Russia became an opponent of all changes of government that were the result of popular demonstrations and protests. But this has also made spontaneous events like the protest in front of the American embassy ten years ago impossible today. Spontaneous demonstrations in front of diplomatic representations have become a regular occurrence that have been accepted by everyone but are interesting to few. The main enemy of the “free world” has become international terrorism, in which Russia is an ally of the West, as if we are finding ourselves in the same entrapment. The fact that the Kosovo Liberation Army was in many ways similar to the West’s enemies today in, say, Afghanistan, is not discussed with much enthusiasm. The West has ceased viewing itself in the zenith of power, while Russia, on the contrary, in recent years has “risen from its knees,” which has given rise to new areas of tension and conflict. Milosevic died in his Hague prison cell during his war crimes trial. The trial itself and the death of the accused (in whose circumstances can easily be found dubious moments) didn’t find considerable resonance in Serbia. There Milosevic was frequently seen as guilty of everything that happened with the country in the 1990s. In the end, all the wars supported or started by him were lost, one after another. Yugoslavia fell apart for good. This was the final act of the drama that was accepted, most likely, with fatigue. For many Russians, Montenegro became perhaps a summer dacha where wars of the past decade are less remembered. For its part, Serbia is not prepared for another war, and in any event is better off materially than it was ten years ago.
In this collection of information, each person can discern his own laws apart from “everything flows, everything changes.” Let us note, perhaps, at least one paradox: everyone in this war got what could be expected. NATO won a military victory and took Kosovo under its control. Yugoslav officials understood perfectly well that they would lose the war, and they did. Serbian society, which had long since grown tired of Milosevic, was finally given the opportunity to overthrow him after the war. The West got the former Yugoslav leader behind bars, although the trial never reached the point where the prosecution’s arguments could be called into question. Russia, both society and the government, were at long last able to express their negative emotions with respect to the West based on fully objective reasons. The Albanians achieved independence. Russia ultimately obtained the ability to recognize the independence of other unrecognized states. Montenegro was able to separate from Yugoslavia peacefully. Everyone got everything. But was anyone made happy by any of this?
