The events of 1917 are often seen in Russia in quite simplistic terms, often as some sort of lesson about the ills of democracy. “Complete freedom” was granted in Russia, and just look what happened as a result.
There is no dispute that the October Revolution and the Civil War that followed were to a certain degree the consequences of weakness and mistakes made by the new democratic government, although other mistakes, like the liquidation of the police, were undoubtedly a consequence of liberal convictions. But at the same time such an approach, as usual, ignores the most important objective factors that led events precisely in one direction and not another. Without these factors, it is impossible to understand why the history of “free Russia” ended in a winter storm. Moreover, the existence of these factors clearly appeared already in the first months after the revolution, for example, during the so-called April crisis, which was provoked by Foreign Minister Milyukov’s unsuccessful note.
March 1917 became a honeymoon of sorts for Russian freedom and democracy. The right-leaning Constitutional Democrats had virtually disbanded as a political party, and the supporters of the old regime had either gone into hiding or had joined the victors. The Provisional Government, therefore, enjoyed considerable support ranging from Purishkevich on the right to Grandmother Breshko-Breshkovskaya on the left.
From the first days of the revolution, however, the new government did not enjoy real power corresponding to the support it received in society. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was acting side by side with Prince Lvov and his ministers. The Soviet wielded a significant amount of real power, including control over the garrison. As then War Minister Guchkov wrote, “the Provisional Government does not wield any kind of real power, and its decrees are implemented only as permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which holds the most important elements of real power, including the armed forces, the railways, the post and the telegraph.” However, the leaders of the Soviet not only had no intention of overthrowing the Provisional Government, in the first weeks after the abdication of Nicholas II, they avoided open confrontation with it. A certain degree of tension existed the whole time, including the fact that the “capitalist ministers” and socialist parties somewhat differently looked at the crucial issue of Russia’s further participation in the war.
In the Fourth Duma the bourgeoise opposition, which was united in the Progressive Bloc, criticized the government not so much from liberal as from patriotic positions. Criticisms centered on the government’s inability to successfully conduct the war. This was neither demagoguery nor political intrigue, for Russian liberals sincerely believed that Russia needed to fulfill its obligation to the alliance and conduct the war until a victory was achieved, regardless of the cost. The socialist camp was dominated by somewhat different opinions, however. It is true that the majority of the leftist parties held to a position of “revolutionary defensiveness,” although even they were not able to count on the mood of the masses, who were tired of war and dreaming of a quick end.
Given these sentiments, on March 14, the Petrograd Soviet delivered an address “to the peoples of the world.” Along with a call to protect the achievements of the revolution from outside enemies, the manifesto also called for a resolute struggle for peace and for resistance to the aggressive imperialist policies of governments. Naturally, this declaration was troubling to the allies. Their ambassadors in Petrograd immediately demanded that the Provisional Government define precisely its relationship to the Soviet’s statement.
Initially, the Provisional Government attempted to respond rather softly to the declaration. On March 27, it issued a statement saying that while the “goal of a free Russia is not domination over other nations, not usurping from them their national possessions, not forcibly seizing other territories,” the government nevertheless intends to continue the war “in full compliance with the commitments it has made with respect to our allies.” The leaders of the Entente, however, viewed this statement as too ambiguous and vague, and they demanded that Lvov’s government make more specific commitments.
As a result, on April 17, at the home of the ailing Guchkov, the government held a meeting where the cabinet unanimously approved the text of a note to the governments of the Entente, which would be signed by Foreign Minister Milyukov. This document, in particular, asserted that “imbued with this new spirit of a liberated democracy, the statements of the Provisional Government, of course, could not present the slightest reason to think that the resulting revolution brought about a weakening of Russia's role in the alliance’s general struggle. On the contrary, the public desire to bring the First World War to a strong victory was only reinforced by the recognition of common responsibility on the part of each and every person.” The transfer of the note was preceded by what would be referred to as a PR campaign today. On April 17, a demonstration of wounded and maimed soldiers was held in the capital. Hundreds of people with disabilities proceeded to the Tauride Palace carrying slogans of “war to a victorious end.” Those who could not walk were carried by trucks. Trotsky, who witnessed the march, later called it a “nightmare.”
The publication of Milyukov’s note sparked sharp outrage in the leftist press. One of the newspapers wrote, the Provisional Government’s statement was “mockery of the aspirations of democracy.” The executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet convened an emergency plenum to discuss the situation, although the crucial role was played by the street. In Petrograd, there was an armed demonstration in which thousands of soldiers took part by going out into the streets under the slogan “Down with Milyukov!” According to Trotsky, 25,000-30,000 soldiers from the Petrograd garrison took part in these processions. Other sources described much larger numbers – up to 100,000 people.
The leaders of the moderate socialist parties were able to convince the soldiers to leave the square in front of the Mariinsky Palace and even return to their barracks. The excitement gripping the city did not subside, however, and it soon became clear that either a decisive military response or a political compromise was needed.
General Lavr Kornilov, commander Petrograd garrison, gave his assurances that he had enough loyal elements to bring order to the city. The majority of the ministers, however, doubted that the government was strong enough and, more importantly, that it had the authority to resort to a forceful solution. Prime Minister Lvov himself said, “for the last time the government is coming under suspicion. It not only lacks support in democracy, but it is meeting with attempts to undermine its credibility. In this situation, the government does not consider itself entitled to take responsibility.” Therefore, in the end it was decided to offer up the ministers who inspired the greatest feelings of animosity among the demonstrators. A decision was also made to dramatically expand the government leftward. Milyukov and Guchkov lost their posts, and several key ministries fell into the hands of the socialists. The Ministry of Agriculture was headed by the SR leader Viktor Chernov, the Ministry of Labor by the Menshevik Matvey Skobelev and the Ministry of Post and Telegraph by the Menshevik Irakli Tsereteli. Alexander Kerensky, formerly the Minister of Justice, headed the Ministry of Defense.
In comparison with the subsequent crises – the June demonstration of the Bolsheviks and Kornilov’s insurrection – the April crisis ended relatively painlessly for the Provisional Government. Several key figures did have to be sacrificed, although the majority of the ministerial posts, including that of the prime minister, remained in the hands of bourgeois parties. Yet it is this crisis, of course, which showed the impending doom of the Provisional Government and the course it had pursued. The issue was not one of endless ministerial reshuffling, which made any real work impossible, nor was it one of the government only having conditional control even in the capital; rather, the events of April clearly indicated the gulf dividing the country and its elite on the most important issue at the moment – the country’s further participation in the war.
The leaders of bourgeois parties talked about what they owed to the allies, the public interest, and other high subjects. The broad masses, however, especially the soldiers, did not grasp these high matters and understood only one thing – that they were tired of war being waged for purposes unknown to them. They wanted to return to their homes as quickly as possible. Accordingly, any party in favor of continuing the war was doomed to failure.
Russian liberals were unable to understand this. The same is true for the leaders of the moderate socialist parties. As a result, people “inevitably” joined the Bolsheviks – the only party that insisted on the immediate conclusion of a peace agreement.
