The recently concluded visit by Patriarch Kirill to Ukraine was interesting to look at from afar, primarily as it was a striking example of the church policy that the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia intends to carry out. Everything else – the masses of believers flowing in to meet with the patriarch, the opposition’s pickets, and the statements by opponents of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine – is unlikely to become a sort of revelation. Something like this visit was expected. Perhaps the greatest concern were the possible actions of local extremists, particularly in western Ukraine, but in general, everything was surprisingly quiet, save for a rather small number of protests and the uncertain behavior of the Ukrainian authorities who tried to persuade the patriarch from visiting Rivne.
Before, during and after the visit, opponents of the patriarch’s visit stated repeatedly that the purpose of the visit was political in nature and that the patriarch had arrived to facilitate Ukraine’s reunification with Russia. Despite these statements, however, his intention was quite the opposite – to make the trip as nonpolitical in nature as possible. The program of the visit itself speaks to this through the patriarch’s minimal interaction with Ukrainian politicians (in ten days, there were only two official meetings with the president and the prime minister). If we talk about this component of the trip, then it could be, as rightly noted, about the implementation of church policies, which the state has nothing to do with.
The nature of the visit was dictated by those objectives that the patriarch pursued in Ukraine. Indeed, he defined them as communication with the faithful – with his flock. “I have only one goal. This goal is as follows – to pray together with the Ukrainian people. To some this may seem a strange statement, to some – a hypocritical one, to some, perhaps, as a statement generally far from the truth. But this is how it is.” This is a simple explanation that precludes any undertone and is unlikely to satisfy the numerous experts and observers who are always looking for hidden and underlying motives, although in fact, it may well be accepted. It was in the conversations, in the numerous meetings with the faithful – monks, clergy and ordinary parishioners – that the main thrust of the trip lied. It was no accident that the patriarch visited all the major regions of Ukraine, visiting the center (Kiev), the east (Donetsk), the south (Crimea) and the west (Rivne, Lutsk, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Koretz and Pochaev). In other words, he came to Ukraine as a shepherd to rightfully and dutifully visit his parishes.
It is not worth forgetting about the crucial importance of Ukraine for the Russian Orthodox Church: 27% of all parishes under the Moscow Patriarchate are located here (i.e., approximately 11,000 out of 29,000, not including the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia). Of course, the issue is not one of imaginary income derived from the Ukrainian dioceses by Moscow, as the autonomists tend to shout; rather, it’s simply hard to imagine the Russian Orthodox Church without Kiev and its ancient dioceses, without a third of its parishes. The patriarch’s visit was no less important for the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which finds itself under constant and intense pressure from both state authorities and supporters of “canonical autonomy” in Ukrainian society. To verify this, one needs only to look at the titles in the leading Ukrainian news media. In fact, the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are so extensive that its real status is approaching that of any autocephalous church. In fact, in internal church matters the Ukrainian Orthodox Church enjoys complete autonomy. Behind the patriarch is only the force of tradition and authority of a united Russian Orthodox Church. Only with his authority as the primate of the church can he influence the situation with respect to the church in Ukraine. Demonstrating the pastoral nature of his visit was the purpose – to show that Ukraine, exactly like Russia, is still a canonical part of the Moscow Patriarchate. The patriarch visited Ukraine not to negotiate with or reason with autocephalous separatists and not to discuss the church’s problems with the president. The visit was “for his own” – for the parishioners and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
Apparently, the patriarch successfully achieved the goal he had set for himself, although it was difficult. The attention paid to his visit to Ukraine was very close, very emotional, and certainly not always benevolent. Ukraine is divided, and information attacks on the “representative of Moscow” were inevitable. The price of each word and each deed was high, much higher than in Russia, and every word and every gesture had to be calibrated. Actually, this was the main intrigue of the visit: would the patriarch stumble in this words and actions? For this it was necessary for him to avoid as much as possible any direct confrontation, not to succumb to the inevitable pressure – simply because the purpose of his visit was entirely different. As it seemed, the ability to defend his position while avoiding a frontal collision and not being provoked or drawn into an unnecessary debate is one of the qualities that characterizes Patriarch Kirill as a clever church politician. This is very important given the difficult situation that the church in Ukraine now finds itself in. Over the course of quite numerous statements, the Russian Orthodox primate very clearly stated his views not only about the division, but also on the Holodomor, the attempts to rewrite the history of the Great Patriotic War and the current economic crisis. He was able, on the whole, to maintain a conciliatory tone. What’s important is that the patriarch made it clear that although he did not intend to get involved in the discussion, he has very definite and sufficiently reasoned positions on each of these important issues for modern Ukraine.
The visit demonstrated once again what seems to be a common fact, although it is one which is drowned out by the informational noise raised by the proponents of an independent national church in Ukraine: with the exception of three regions in western Ukraine (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate is the dominant church throughout the country. In other words, it really is Ukraine’s national church. The tens of thousands of believers gathered for a meeting with the patriarch in all regions of the country elegantly bore witness to this – including in the western regions of the country. This argument is one that Ukrainian autonomists will have difficulty challenging.
We should not assume, however, that all is well with the affairs of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The main danger can be found in the continuing attempts to split the unity of the Ukrainian dioceses with the Moscow Patriarchate, plunging them into a national church independent from Moscow. This danger is still strong, and the outcome of this struggle has not yet been resolved and will largely depend on the position of the Ukrainian bishops, as well as on the general tone of Russian-Ukrainian bilateral relations. Thoughtful in all respects, Patriarch Kirill’s visit to Ukraine could be an important step in preserving the existing church unity, the value of which goes beyond any political and narrowly defined national concepts.
